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MR. BRICE:
Now, I've come to tell you about something that is entirely new.
It only really came out in the last few weeks, in fact, while I've been
here at Tulane, and it is something which is quite revolutionary and it
is something which emulates the thinking of an American
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professional salvor who is also an attorney, Mr. Arnold Witte, and it
really is a striking development.
The title of my paper, which you may or may not have seen, is
"No Cure, No Pay, No Good?" And you all will know the concept of
no cure, no pay, which is fundamental to English salvage law and
American salvage law. In other words, the salvor gets absolutely
nothing, no matter what money he's spent, no matter how hard he's
worked, unless he achieves success-that's the cure provided there is
an adequate salved fund. That's the value of the salved property at
the time when the services end. Now, that's been the rule for
centuries, and it certainly was operative in this country. Fortunately,
American salvage law and English salvage law are largely identical in
many respects. The problem is this: The number of casualties in the
world has dropped, but when they occur, they tend to be, in many
cases, very serious indeed, and third parties are affected. You may get
a case of a ship which is ablaze, drifting near a lee shore, and carrying
fuel oil or some other toxic cargo such that services are urgently
needed.
Now, the only people who in reality can do this are professional
salvors or tugboat companies with professional expertise, and
unfortunately, it costs a lot of money for tugs, salvage personnel, and
salvage equipment to be kept on the speculation that there may be the
need for a salvage service. So, no cure, no pay can operate as a
disincentive in those cases where services are urgently needed but the
prospect of getting any sensible salvage remuneration is very low.
Efforts were made in the 1989 Salvage Convention in cases affecting
the environment to deal with this problem, and in many ways those
efforts were successful but in other ways they were not successful.
Now, what is it that Mr. Witte started about a year or two ago? I
was in a taxi with him in London, and he spelled out his ideas to me,
which were quite revolutionary, and thereafter there has been wide
consultation with all business interests, salvors, shipowners, cargo
owners, underwriters, and P & I clubs, to come to a solution to this
problem. The way it works is this: They've drafted this new contract
they call SCOPIC, the terms of which will be set out in a paper I
wrote in the Tulane Law Review. The new contract at the moment is
in its final draft stage. I'm told it is hoped that the new contract will
be operable from about June of this year.
Now, the way it works is this: At the moment, it only operates in
cases where a Lloyd's Form of salvage agreement has been signed.
This is the salvage contract most widely used by professional
salvors.... If the salvor having arrived on the scene realizes that the
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prospects of getting paid a proper salvage reward are low, he gives a
notice to the shipowner to say that he's now relying upon SCOPIC.
What then happens is the shipowner must within two days put up a
guarantee for the salvor's claim for $3 million, a fixed figure, but that
figure could be modified up and down as circumstances become
clearer. If the security, the guarantee of the $3 million, is not put up
within two days, the salvor can say, "Right. Forget SCOPIC. I'll
have to go with the Lloyd's Form." Now, there's no point in having a
remedy of any sort unless somebody is willing to pay it. What has
happened is this: The P & I clubs have indicated that although it is
not automatic, in the ordinary course of events, they will give the
guarantee. So it is a guarantee by the shipowners' P & I clubs to the
salvor. The cargo plays no part in this at all. So how does SCOPIC
work? Well, you know with salvage we have to make an assessment
under what is now -article 13 of the Salvage Convention or The
Blackwall in America. We have to assess through litigation just what
the salvage remuneration should be. Under SCOPIC tariff rates, that's
all gone.
This is what's revolutionary. There is an annex to this new
SCOPIC contract setting out rates of remuneration, tariff rates of
remuneration for different types of tug, salvage master, salvage
equipment and the like, and there's also a guarantee the salvor gets his
out-of-pocket expenses.
To give you a practical idea of it, if you've got a 5,000
horsepower tug, then that tug automatically gets $10,000 per day plus
twenty-five percent. So that's $12,500 per day. If it is a 10,000
horsepower tug, it is $17,500 per day plus twenty-five percent. If it is
a very large, 20,000 horsepower tug; you get $27,500 per day plus
twenty-five percent. So the rates are generous, and the bonus, the
twenty-five percent, is a fixed one. Now, what happens, is there a risk
of the salvor, having got onto these attractive rates, ripping-off the
shipowner and the P & I club?
Well, this has been looked into with careful negotiations. What
is happening is this: There's a panel of experts who are going to be set
up and approved by the industry generally. There's going to be a
committee of twelve who will set up this panel of experts who can go
to the casualty. They are going to be known as Shipowners' Casualty
Representatives. They will board the casualty and keep an eye on
everything that's going on, and the salvor, through the salvage master,
must make regular reports to the shipowner, and he must consult with
the Shipowner's Casualty Representative on board, and if there's any
difference of opinion, then this has to be noted. But the idea is to get
1999]
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cooperation. This is not a lawyer's contract. It is a contract drawn up
by businessmen who are actually involved in salvage operations and
they want to see the thing operate successfully.
In addition to that, cargo owners are also entitled to send along
their own representative. So this is entirely new. Instead of no cure,
no pay, if you opt for SCOPIC, you have a guaranteed remuneration
for the salvor. That means the professional salvor has an incentive to
have sufficient craft and men go to the scene of a casualty and stay
there even though in the ordinary course of events there would be no
adequate salvage remuneration.
Now, the contract is, I'm afraid, fairly complex. I've just given
it to you in outline. What I feel myself is this: The present system
has had its disadvantages. If the business community got together to
form this contract, to draw it up, then we as lawyers should give every
support that we can to see that it works. Because if the salvage
industry falls apart, then there will be nobody available when a
casualty occurs off the coast of Florida, in the Gulf of Mexico, or
wherever, to actually save it. If they know they are going to get
guaranteed remuneration on a generous basis, then in those
circumstances they'll be more encouraged.
JUDGE SEAR:
I first want to ask you, Geoffrey Brice, whether or not you think
in the area of salvage there is uniformity, and secondly, if you will tell
us whether you think uniformity is important.
MR. BRICE:
Well, as far as the United Kingdom and the United States are
concerned, you had a judge in 1791 who had the good sense to say,
after the passing of your Judiciary Act that, in effect, as the courts in
America had been applying English salvage law before 1791, they
would continue doing it, and that is why our laws are the same.
I think that the sort of uniformity which started with the Brussels
Convention of 1910-so that's, what, ninety years ago-was a
valuable step because then people knew where they were. I'm afraid
there are some parts of the world where the governments are not very
scrupulous, and a shipowner can be held over a barrel. So I think,
first of all, there is uniformity of salvage law, in fact, in most
countries since the 1910 Convention. The 1989 Convention is
operative in most maritime states.
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So I think uniformity is important when, after all, ships are
traveling from one jurisdiction to another, cargos, maybe a container
ship. You have over a thousand interests. I think it is important that
people should know where they stand. And this, again, is one of the
advantages of Arnold Witte's proposal. Provided the Lloyd's Form is
signed, everybody will know where they stand as far as the amount
they have to pay.
Yes, I do think uniformity is important. And if you go back in
history, the systems varied enormously port to port, let alone
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
JUDGE SEAR:
How about areas like limitation?
MR. BRICE:
As far as limitation is concerned, the United States and the
United Kingdom had a very similar system up to about the 1850s. We
both operated on the theory of limiting to the value of the ship and the
freight in the course of being earned. We changed our limitation
system in the 1850s (when the trans-Atlantic immigrant traffic
started) to tonnage, because you might have a ship, which was of little
value, and it was fair that the owner of the ship would have to pay at
least some compensation; so we did it on a tonnage basis. Again, I
personally am in favor of limitation on a tonnage basis, which
operates through most of the commercial world, but I realize it is
impractical to get it changed in this country.
JUDGE SEAR:
Well, doesn't it take both the United States and Great Britain if it
is just the two countries that have this difference between them-had
the same and now they are different-shouldn't they in consultation
with each other decide on the changes?
MR. BRICE:
My feeling is this: If I could just in one moment explain, the
reason why we changed our rule to a tonnage basis in the 1850s,
which was, then, I think adopted pretty worldwide, is because that
was thought to be fairer. I do believe, in fact, there's much to be said
for the United States coming into line with the other jurisdictions of
the world which are tonnage-based, because under that system, you're
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guaranteed a limitation fund; whereas, under your system, if the ship
is lost, you may get nothing.
So yes, Morey, I do think that there's something to be said for the
United States thinking again about whether or not it should accede to
ratify the Limitation Convention of 1976. But I realize that's a matter
of politics, and it is very hard to get Congress interested in that type of
thing.
MR. PALMER:
Geoffrey, could you just fill in for us a little bit about the new
relationship that may exist between SCOPIC and the Lloyd's Form
and the other arrangements that might be made?
MR. BRICE:
Yes. The way it will work is this: If you have a pure salvage
case, then SCOPIC will have no application. If you have a contract
for salvage under Lloyd's Form, then it is solely for the salvor to
decide whether he wants SCOPIC. He's the person who decides.
There is, however, nothing to stop parties agreeing privately to have
SCOPIC.
SCOPIC is well ahead of the Salvage Convention. That
Convention of 1989 was drawn up by lawyers. It in some respects
has guaranteed remuneration, what we call special compensation, and
it may not have worked as well as what was intended. So if it goes as
pure salvage, ordinary salvage law applies together with a special
compensation regime in environmental cases. In contract salvage,
SCOPIC only applies at the moment, as is intended, if the Lloyd's
Form is signed. Lloyd's Form is signed by professional salvors.
JUDGE SEAR:
I'd like to ask you, Charlie, whether you think there's uniformity
in towage and whether there's a need for it. If not, why not?
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Is there uniformity in towage? No. Is there a need for it?
Perhaps. But I suspect that in the United States, and particularly from
what I heard yesterday and last night, I suspect that uniformity in the
United States means just about the same as bipartisanship means to
Democrats.
I would like to see the United States at least change the Bisso
rules so that we can, like other maritime nations of the world, have the
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freedom to contract. I think Bisso is our big outstanding black mark
on what we would like to see in the towage area.
JUDGE SEAR:
How about you, Nick? How about in collision?
MR. HEALY:
Well, as far as the International Rules are concerned, of course,
we have complete uniformity. We have some differences between the
International Rules and the Inland Rules, but I do not think they really
affect the question of uniformity. The principal difference, of course,
is with respect to the meaning of the one and two short blasts
maneuvering signals.
Under the Inland Rules, they are signals of intention, not turning
signals. They must be sounded when the conditions are appropriate,
even if neither vessel is required to make a turn in order to effect safe
passage; whereas, under the International Rules (COLREGS) the
signals are turning signals. They are never sounded except when a
turn is made, with one exception: Under COLREGS, when there is an
overtaking situation and the facts are such that an overtaking can be
made safely only if the vessel ahead takes avoiding action, the
overtaking vessel is required to sound a signal of two prolonged blasts
followed by one short blast when the intention is to pass on the
starboard side of the vessel ahead, and two prolonged blasts followed
by two short blasts when the intention is to pass on the port side of the
vessel ahead. And if the vessel ahead agrees, she must respond with
one prolonged, one short, one prolonged and one short blast,
regardless of the side on which the overtaking is to take place. But
the Inland Rules are effective only in pilotage waters and if the
vessels concerned are navigated by pilots licensed for the particular
waters, there should be no problem, assuming the pilots know their
rules and obey them.
In the collision area, the significant areas of disagreement are
(1) with respect to The Pennsylvania Rule, which seems to be unique
to the United States and (2) with respect to the "innocent cargo" rule.
The Reliable Transfer case put us on the same footing as the
subscribers to the Brussels Convention of 1910 insofar as the two
vessels are concerned. But the effect of a both-to-blame collision
where there is cargo damage is quite different. Under the Brussels
Convention of 1910, each ship is liable only in proportion to her own
degree of fault as far as cargo is concerned; so that if the carrying
19991
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vessel is protected by the Hague Rules or the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act or the Harter Act or a charter party provision against liability
to its own cargo, the cargo ends up bearing a percentage of the blame
corresponding to the degree of fault on the part of the carrying vessel
and recovers from the noncarrying vessel only in proportion to the
degree of fault on her part; whereas, under American law, cargo
recovers 100% from the noncarrying vessel. That is a big difference
between our law and the law of most of the rest of the world.
MR. BROWN:
I guess my first question concerns the criticism leveled in the
paper against the decision in Stevens v. White City back in 1932. The
paper suggests that it may be better to make the tower the bailee of
the towed vessel and impose the consequent burdens on the tower as a
bailee. The White City case really involved a tow that was manned at
least for part of the trip and could have been manned for the entire
trip. The most plausible reason given for the damage to the tow in
that case was that it might have struck some driftwood or some
flotsam and jetsam that, to my mind at least, should not be something
that the tower automatically should be liable for.
As for the burden of proof, there's an analogous 1841 case by the
Supreme Court, Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge
Corp., holding that in a noncommon carriage situation the burden of
proof remains with the bailor and, in this case, that would be the
owner of the towed vessel. So I think the notion of making the tower
the bailee of the vessel is really not entirely appropriate, and I think
Stevens was rightly decided.
The author, Mr. Lugenbuhl, suggests it would be desirable to
have a judicially fashioned rule that delivery of a tow in good order
and condition and receipt in bad order requires the tug to explain that
the damage was not due to its fault. I would like to pose the question
to him: Why would that be desirable, or is it all that desirable under
the circumstances?
MR. LUGENBUHL:
We have to remember Stevens really is a twofold decision. I
think Stevens correctly stated the duty of the tug to its tow, that is, to
use that degree of care that reasonable mariners similarly situated
would use. That duty of care has been cited in almost every towage
case that you can see that's followed Stevens. I have no quarrel with
establishing what the tug's duty is to that tow. My concern with
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Stevens is that it is as close to bailment as you can get. You say the
DRIFTER was probably manned for part of the time and so forth. I
would suggest that such an able practitioner as yourself would have
no trouble in today's world if you represented the DRIFTER getting a
successful judgment against the WHITE CITY.
The towage law has evolved to such an extent that we now have
all sorts of exceptions to Stevens. We even, God forbid, use the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. We shift the burden of proof. So all
we're talking about is the burden of proof in Stevens, and in today's
world, I see nothing wrong with a tug having to explain that it used
that degree of care that Stevens required to exculpate itself, but the
burden would just shift to the tug.
It would also enable us to properly present the true relationship
of the tug to the tow. I think the Stevens court misunderstood and a lot
of courts do. I think the Supreme Court in Bisso obviously
misunderstood the relationship of the tug to the tow because they
referred to a phantom monopoly and the degree of care exercised by
bailees and common carriers, treating the tugs just as if they were a
common carrier or a bailee. I doubt that any court will change
Stevens, but I think it shows what the relationship is or ought to be.
MR. PALMER:
Charlie, is there any reasonable chance that Bisso can be
overturned in order to achieve freedom of parties to contract, for
instance, if they are of equal bargaining power?
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Well, Dick, I guess the simple answer to that is if you can figure
out a way for the Supreme Court of the United States to take a towage
case involving a release from liability clause, I think it would be
overturned. But how you'll get them to take it is another matter.
JUDGE SEAR:
But aren't we kind of skirting the issue anyway? Aren't we
going around through the back door in all of those cases and ignoring
the Supreme Court's decision in Bisso?
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Yes. What do you do about deductibles? What do you do about
self-insurance? What do you do in the instance where your insurer
goes belly up?
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MR. PALMER:
Name and waive.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Name and waive. Why do we go to these subterfuges when, in
essence, what we ought to do is just have the courts tell us: Bisso isn't
the law anymore. There is no monopoly. Bisso was wrong about the
monopoly. Bisso was wrong about the relationship of the tug to the
tow, and by God, you people are in equal bargaining positions. You
ought to be able to contract the way you want to, and that would
include a release from liability. Our English friends permit that.
MR. BRICE:
If I could chip in on that one, to an English lawyer, this
discussion is simply amazing because we have, first of all, standard
forms of towage contract in the United Kingdom and also in Europe.
Secondly, those contracts are approved, in fact, by public bodies
like monopolies' bodies, but the other thing is we often allocate risks
according to insurance. So the tug bears all risks for damage to the
tug no matter whose fault it is, and the tow bears all damage to the
tow even if it is the tug's fault.
So we definitely have freedom of contract. We even have an Act
in England called the Unfair Contract Terms Act, and towage is
expressly excluded from that Act so that there can be total freedom of
contract in towage. I say in reality we have these standard towage
contracts. I do not know if you have them in America, but they are
used in England.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Let me be the devil's advocate and say that there's nothing
wrong with Bisso. It should be extended. It should be extended to get
rid of the pilotage clause. The differentiation between pilotage
clauses and towage clauses was always unconvincing, and perhaps if
the court ever looked back at this thing many years later, they should
get rid of the pilotage clause.
MR. PALMER:
A brief comment: The pilotage clause has been the law for a
long time and has worked out, I think, quite consistently between
shipowners and tug owners who are contracted to transport a vessel
from one place to another in a port. There have been less, I believe,
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cases on that than there used to be, and I think the industry has settled
down.
MR. HAYDEN:
But why should that be upheld and not Bisso?
MR. PALMER:
Well, Bisso is a more general kind of a problem. Towage is all
over the world with the drill rigs; it goes into other regions of the
country, and in the pilotage clause case, we have separate agreements
in separate parts of the United States. You have a certain clause in
New York and perhaps in other east coast places, but out in southern
California your pilot is an employee, not an independent contractor,
and the law is quite different in various regions. That may be one of
our problems.
MR. BROWN:
If I may contribute, there's another distinction between the
pilotage clause and the Bisso-type decision; that is, the pilotage clause
affects a pilot acting on a ship that is manned normally under the
command of a captain who has at least a certain degree of
supervision, maybe a lot of supervision, over what the pilot does.
In the unmanned tow situation, you do not have that sense of
control, which I think was one factor in the decision. But I think it all
boils down to a question of price and who picks up the insurance for
the deal, and I must say, basically, that I think there should be freedom
of contract. And if that's allowed and there's no overreaching on the
part of one side or the other, there ought to be a way around Bisso.
JUDGE SEAR:
We talk about the Supreme Court overturning Bisso and coming
out with a new rule or a new theory. If it is so much in demand, why
don't the maritime associations seek legislation that changes the rule?
It is done all the time.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Well, I know of no efforts on behalf of any of the associations to
seek such a change, but I'd like to ask you: Why can't the courts at
least consider this?
It seems to me-and it is really in response to what Joe said-
that almost all of the courts since Dixilyn, in any event-because
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Dixilyn was a travesty-but since Dixilyn it seems to me that the
courts have gone out of their way, through the back door to try to get
around Bisso, recognizing that it is wrong. And I think most of the
courts that have considered it today, with the exception of that Ninth
Circuit case Dillingham and recently the Twenty Grand case in the
Fifth Circuit, all really have to swallow their tongues to say that
getting the benefit of insurance is not giving the benefit of an
exculpatory clause. That's a recognition that Bisso is wrong. And I'd
just like to see it come back up through the courts. I suspect maybe
we'd get another case out of it. But in today's world where we have
choice of rates, where we have the allocation of risk by means of
insurance, we ought to give the towing industry the freedom to
contract and not be stymied by a hasty decision on a record not
supportive of its conclusion, which Bisso was.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
The question is whether or not the Bisso doctrine can effectively
be met by a requirement in the contract that the towed vessel maintain
insurance for the benefit of the towing vessel. And going perhaps
beyond that a little bit, would it be proper and possible to obtain an
arrangement whereby the towed vessel names the tower as a named
insured in the policy? Now, would that overcome Bisso?
MR. LUGENBUHL:
In my view it would; and I think that view would be shared by at
least the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits. I can't tell you what would
happen to that situation in other circuits, but I think in those two
circuits, Dillingham and Twenty Grand, I think those courts would go
along with an obligation-a separate obligation on behalf of the
owner to procure and maintain insurance on the tow for the benefit of
the tug. I would still have some problems as to what happens if the
insurance company, although seemingly proper, goes belly up.
Even the Fifth and Ninth Circuits would have problems with
that. We would still have the same problem of how to dispose of any
deductible that might be in the insurance. That could, of course, be
taken care of by a contract, and you have the question of self-
insurance.
But those questions remain after Twenty Grand and Dillingham,
and we just do not have any solution to them because every time you
try to turn around and do something, you're met with Bisso and
Dixilyn. Because, remember, Dixilyn was a choice of rates and an
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insuring provision where the tow did, in fact, agree to provide
insurance and failed to provide it because the underwriter in that case
said, "Well, we do not have to worry about this because Bisso will
make this contract illegal." The Supreme Court per curiam reversed
the Court of Appeals in Dixilyn and said Bisso rules. So the method
you suggest is the best we can do in today's world.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
I have a question on Bisso. A friend of mine and I have a case
currently being considered in the District of New Jersey. We had
reciprocal insurance provisions in our contract, and there were "hold
harmless" provisions as well. The problem we ran up against is I
represented the person that was, let's say, not the tower. We had
reciprocal insurance, and the tower indicated that we would be named
on their P & I policy. Now, as far as most people are concerned who
are not completely sophisticated in P & I coverage, they would
consider themselves, well, if I'm going to be an additional insured in
a P & I policy, I've got the same coverage as the member. Well, lo
and behold, in this particular situation-and I think probably in most
situations-the P & I club comes back and says: "Guess what? You
may be an additional insured, but we have what's called a misdirected
arrow clause in our rules, and in the misdirected arrow clause, you
might be named as an additional insured, but you do not really have
the same coverage as the member has." The P & I club will also say:
"You're only insured for those things which you were accidentally
sued for which really were the responsibility of the member; so
therefore, you do not have the same coverage that the tower has."
Now, most people who are negotiating these contracts for
insurance are going to think if we've got reciprocal insurance
provisions and I'm naming the tower on my policy and he's naming
me in his, I'm going to have the same coverage as the tower. That
apparently is not going to be the position of the P & I clubs.
So to some extent, it seems to me that Bisso might have some
relevance in that the public is not aware of what we would think of
conventionally as each party named on their insurances. So to that
extent, I've got a little bit of a question about whether Bisso should be
overruled and overturned, or perhaps it is just simply that the public
has got to be educated and know all the ins and outs and
sophistications of the P & I provision. But it is a practical problem in
the business world, and I think that as long as Bisso is out there it will
be an added protection for the other side that is not aware of the P & I
provisions. But again, philosophically, I do not disagree with you.
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Parties should be able to contract what they want to contract for. But
Bisso might be an added protection that maybe should stay there.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
I do not do anything with towing. I just want to know why you
want to get rid of a warranty of workmanlike service, and what would
you replace it with? I mean, it seems incredible to me that all this talk
is trying to get people weaseling out of what they are supposed to be
doing: driving the thing carefully so that the goods get undamaged to
the far end. Everybody is trying to say: "No, no, no! Let's contract
so that I do not have to drive carefully." What is this? Are you trying
to turn them into New York cab drivers or something? Please.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
I think if that's a question it indicates a complete
misunderstanding of the warranty of workmanlike performance that I
referred to in the paper. The warranty of workmanlike performance
that I referred to and that I say has no place in the law of towage is
that created by the courts following the Ryan v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship theory, which is basically the warranty of workmanlike
performance that led to the indemnity in the ship-stevedore-
longshoreman triangle in which they engrafted into every stevedoring
contract an implied warranty of workmanlike performance so as to
give rise to a claim for indemnity, including attorney fees, against the
offending stevedore. It has no place in the law of towage. The
obligation of the tug would not change in any way if you eliminate the
warranty. The warranty just doesn't belong.
Ryan-I'm sure that the panel on personal injury probably
discussed it-is as bad a case to me as is Bisso. It should be dead
now, particularly since the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers' Act. Some courts still want to do Ryan
indemnity, primarily because attorneys want attorneys' fees. I do not
want to change what the tug owes to the tow.
JUDGE SEAR:
But isn't that, Charlie, what I was talking about earlier when I
said that it seems to me the bar that is dissatisfied with Stevens and
with Bisso just ought to change it legislatively like they did with the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. That was a
good example of what the organized bar can do when it wants to.
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MR. LUGENBUHL:
Well, Judge, most practitioners believe that the Ryan type of
indemnity would fail after the 1972 amendments to the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Act.
JUDGE SEAR:
Well, it did. The legislation addressed itself specifically to
longshoremen and harbor workers because it is different-it is a
compensation scheme. And there was a quid pro quo that each gave.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Well, I guess when the people who acted to get the '72
amendments passed thought they were killing Ryan, they neglected to
have Congress bury it, because it has been resurrected in some areas
unfortunately. Does that answer your question?
JUDGE SEAR
No, I think the gentleman's point is well taken. In those areas in
which the legislation didn't cure Ryan and the areas that you're
talking about, the gentleman says all you've got to do is what you're
supposed to do and you've got no problems.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
But we use Ryan, which is a longshoremen-ship-stevedore
situation, to invent an implied warranty of workmanlike performance.
We kill that insofar as the longshoremen-stevedore-ship situation is
concerned by the 1972 amendments, but we then take the Ryan theory
of indemnity, which has its origin in that same triangle, and engraft it
onto other areas of our law improperly, and towage is one of them.
MR. PALMER:
In the pilotage clause situation, you have a warranty anyway
when a party contracts with somebody who doesn't own the ship, in
other words, a contract with a charterer. The towage agreement has a
warranty in it, and attorneys' fees and disbursements are included.
There is, of course, no warranty when you have the contract with the
owner of the ship. So it really doesn't belong. It was a freak case, if I
remember correctly, and probably either Ray or Dick can remember
the name of the case where the warranty was first applied in the
transport situation.
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MR. HAYDEN:
If I may ask a question of Mr. Brice now that under SCOPIC
they are going to get guarantees, that is, the salvors will obtain
guarantees from the shipowner, I presume that innocent cargo will no
longer be required to give salvage guarantees.
MR. BRICE:
Unfortunately, that's not correct. The way it works is this: That
the article 13 obligation still continue, so the cargo is required to put
up security in the normal way. One thing I didn't have time to explain
is this: The SCOPIC payment is only payable if the amount of the
SCOPIC remuneration exceeds the article 13 or the Blackwall
salvage.
MR. HAYDEN:
So it is a fall-back situation?
MR. BRICE:
It is a fall-back situation, yes. Of course, if, in fact, very little or
nothing is going to be recovered under article 13, then the shipowner
or really his P & I club foots the whole of the SCOPIC payment. But
you do a balancing act in cases where there is going to be a Blackwall
remuneration, albeit it is going to be at the low level.
MR. HAYDEN:
So you pray for enough salved property and also pray for a good
reward?
MR. BRICE:
You do, indeed, yes.
MR. PALMER:
Geoffrey, what do you think can be done to resolve the conflict
between salvors and the marine archeologists with reference to the
convention that's working its way up and other salvage and
preservation considerations?
MR. BRICE:
Thanks for that question. This is, in fact, a pressing problem.
With modem technology, it is now possible for artifacts to be
recovered all over the world, not only here in the Caribbean, for
420 [Vol. 24
ADMIRAL TY LA W A T THE MILLENNIUM
example, but all over the world. And archeologists and historians are
very worried about this.
What I'd like to commend the United States courts for is this:
They have developed principles, which say, yes, certainly you can
salve ancient wrecks and the like, but you have to apply the highest
scientific standards. I've been running a campaign back in Europe to
say we should adopt that principle so the salvor who invests money
and time and effort in recovering artifacts can get his salvage reward
once he does so. At the same time, he must cooperate with scientists,
archeologists, and historians on site to see that the information they
require is carefully preserved and that he doesn't damage the cultural
heritage.
It is a continuing conflict. As I say, in April of this year in Paris,
there is going to be another meeting to try and push through this new
convention. The new convention, by the way, seeks to ban salvors
from all historic wrecks. I do not wish to be cynical, but just think
how you'd do that worldwide. It is difficult enough here in America,
but to seek to do that worldwide is an objective which I do not think
will be obtained.
MR. PALMER:
Interesting. Thank you. I just have a short follow-up on the
Titanic. There is a recent decision which I haven't read but it is
reported to hold that taking photographs at the sunken wreck was a
salvage service. Is there anything worthwhile to consider about that
in the salvage law?
MR. BRICE:
This is, indeed, a most interesting and, if I might say, bold and
courageous decision by a judge I think on the Second Circuit, a case
called Lindsay. The learned judge appears to have held that taking
photographs of a sunken wreck can make the photographer a salvor or
cosalvor. I find that a difficult concept because salvage is about the
recovery of property of value. But I do support the policy behind the
decision that the gathering of information is useful.
In ordinary salvage law, if you provide another person with
information which enables him to salve property, then the provision of
information to the salvor is part of the salvage service. I found it
difficult, however, to understand how the mere taking of photographs
of a sunken wreck, although it adds to one's knowledge and
information, can be a salvage service. What's the salved fund?
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What's the danger, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera? But that case, I
gather, is going on appeal in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals; so I
await the results with considerable interest.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
Geoffrey, you've already explained what SCOPIC is, and I
assure you that I'm not dealing from a learned position on this one.
But I'm trying to understand it. Could the existence of SCOPIC
remuneration lead to a reduction in the general level of salvage
awards to professional salvors when made by courts?
MR. BRICE:
Yes. You see, if a salvor says, "I hold myself out in business as
being a person who does salvage on no cure, no pay terms," the court
says, "Well, that's very commendable in the interest of the whole
maritime community; therefore, we give you an added incentive."
But once you take that away because you have SCOPIC, it could lead
to a situation where salvage rewards to professional salvors in general
are reduced.
I'm hoping, however, that in the Lloyd's Form-we are drafting
a new Lloyd's Form-that there will be an express provision which
says: Notwithstanding the fact that there's SCOPIC, you proceed
with salvage awards in the ordinary way. You're not going to be
influenced by that. I think that's what the businessmen who drafted
SCOPIC wanted. But I do see the objection. It is one which I think is
a serious one and something that we're going to have to try and
overcome. Thanks, Charlie.
MR. LUGENBUHL:
One other thing about SCOPIC. When SCOPIC creates a so-
called Shipowner's Casualty Representative, doesn't that create a
conflict between that Casualty Representative and the salvor-salvage
master?
MR. BRICE:
Yes. It can well do unless the two behave professionally. That's
why the Shipowner's Casualty Representative must come from an
approved panel which is being drawn up by all members of the
industry. So it is intended that you'll get a knowledgeable person who
is not there to foul things up but there to assist the salvage master in
giving advice. We're hoping, in practice, the conflict will not occur.
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JUDGE SEAR:
All right, Mr. Brown.
MR. BROWN:
Geoffrey, this is related to SCOPIC also. Do you see any
significant risk that having SCOPIC as a fall-back position might
result in the salvor putting out less effort than he might otherwise do
to salvage the ship and cargo?
MR. BRICE:
The answer is, of course, when you give any commercial
organization a guaranteed remuneration, you've got that risk. On the
other hand, that's what the SCR, the Shipowner's Casualty
Representative, and other representatives are there to avoid. So if
they see the salvor doing that, they make a complaint, and that
complaint must be dealt with straight away. But you're absolutely
right. As I see it, it would be a possibility unless care is taken to
avoid it.
MR. PALMER:
I just had one question, Geoffrey, about a salvage problem in the
States where the new statute requires or permits the federal
government to give ownership of a piece of salvage property that's
embedded in the shore lands of the state to that state. What does that
do to the general motivation of salvors to bring up wrecks and other
property to get compensation for their efforts?
MR. BRICE:
Well, in the United States, you have concepts such as the
Submerged Lands Act, Abandoned Shipwrecks Act, and your concept
of treasure salvage or law of finds, which we do not have in any shape
or form in England and as far as I know nowhere else in the world. It
is, as you know, rather complex legislation in America, but the fact
that property can be diverted to the states or to the United States could
act as a disincentive to salvors. But that's the sort of thing which the
new UNESCO Convention on protecting the cultural heritage is
seeking to achieve worldwide. I do not think it is a good idea. I
attended the meeting of our state department about three weeks ago
with somebody else in this room, and we were lawyers facing a lot of
archeologists. And we made the point, well, it is all very well, but the
museums, if they want to have artifacts there for the public to see or
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scientists to study, they've got to be obtained, found and obtained. It
is very often the professional salvors as opposed to the tomb robbers
who, in fact, do the necessary research and get the artifacts to put in
the museums.
So I think to blacken salvors as if they are all tomb robbers is
wholly wrong, and you in the United States have proved that because
in case after case after case the courts have commended the efforts of
the salvors operating in a scientific manner. That is what I am
seeking to persuade those in Europe to change, in other words, to
adopt a solution which your courts have already found.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Judge, thank you. Further to what Mr. Palmer asked about, the
1987 Abandoned Shipwrecks Act abolishes the law of salvage and the
law of finds in the case of abandoned and embedded shipwrecks. So
salvage is entirely out. The purpose of the legislation was to put the
question of who can remove abandoned and embedded shipwrecks
solely to state governments. They are going to have the entire say as
to that kind of salvage.
MR. BRICE:
Well, that is what they are seeking to achieve in this new
convention worldwide, in other words, the banning of salvage
operations worldwide. But the assumption is that states are all
good-I'm not talking about the United States-but countries, other
nations, are not all good boys.
Well, I was involved in a case where my clients had invested a
lot of money in searching for medieval treasure-it was porcelain-
near the coastline of a particular state, but on the high seas. What
happened was that state, when this property had been recovered, sent
out gunboats. They pointed machine guns at my clients. They took
everything they had. It has never been seen since. I'm afraid-and
this is a point I seek to make to the archeologists-in international
politics there are some bad guys as well as good guys, and it is
hopeless, in my view, to seek to legislate worldwide, to say no
salvage, no recovery of artifacts on the water, because it is impossible
to police, and I think it will mean that artifacts which should be in
museums will not be there. How does it work in the States? Do you
find this prohibition under the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act leads to a
discouragement of salvors recovering artifacts for your museums?
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PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Well, it has not been in effect long enough, but I do not think it
has yet discouraged the museums. They are negotiating with the
states and getting the rights to the abandoned shipwrecks from the
states.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
Thank you. I'm, from Canada, and I just want to make one brief
observation and then put a question to Geoffrey Brice. The
observation I want to make is that just as a matter of information,
Canada too has ratified the 1989 Salvage Convention. As between
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada at least, since the
theme has been about uniformity, on that subject anyway, there is a
high degree of uniformity.
My question to Geoffrey Brice is one that I think he might expect
because I've already talked to him about it, and that is this: Is there a
conflict between the new arrangements under SCOPIC and the
Salvage Convention? The reason for putting that question is that
there has already been perhaps a somewhat premature discussion in
the Legal Committee of the IMO as to whether something has to be
done about article 14 in view of the fact that there are difficulties in
interpreting and applying that particular provision. So I would be
interested to hear Geoffrey Brice's views on that question. Thank
you.
MR. BRICE:
Thanks very much indeed for that. The 1989 Salvage
Convention is a private law convention. It is not a public law
convention. Article 6.1 of that Convention makes it quite clear that
with one limited exception freedom of contract exists under the
Convention. So parties are free to do whatever they want and to
exclude the Convention altogether if they want. Therefore, I do not
think SCOPIC in any way is inconsistent with the 1989 Salvage
Convention. The exclusion deals with the environment, which I need
not go into in detail.
So no, I think that the IMO is quite right to look at the operation
of article 14 of the Convention. The CMI is already doing it, and it
does need, I think, a radical rethink. But what has happened here is
this, and I think it is so important. You can sit in committees-and I
was involved with the 1989 Convention, from 1981 through to
1989-for years of discussions, and then you come up with a
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wonderful shiny convention and only a limited number of states will
ratify it. So all the work, while it is being done, it is of some use, but
life moves on and businessmen, salvors, and shipowners and insurers
and the like come to their own solutions. I think it is very important
in organizations such as the IMO that they should look to see what the
business community is, in fact, doing. And if the business community
wants SCOPIC, then I think something might be done when looking
at perhaps the articles of the 1989 Convention to see if something can
be done which reflects what the business community actually wants.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
My question is to Geoffrey Brice. First, I guess, a statement on
the legislation in the United States with regards to treasure salvage.
There is the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuaries Act that
essentially has halted all salvage, for all practical purposes treasure
salvage, within the Florida Keys. It extends out to the boundaries of
the contiguous zone, and through there we had the privilege, I guess,
of representing Mel Fisher in a recent case in the Southern District of
Florida where the Southern District essentially said if you do not have
an existing salvage right, salvage claim at the time of the passage of
that act, then you have to get a permit. The negotiations with the
government for acquiring that permit are rather one-sided.
So I think that the effect-regardless of the Abandoned
Shipwrecks Act-what we have is the federal government now going
in and laying claim to all of that, and it has essentially-when Mel
Fisher died just recently here, many thought with his death that ended
the treasure salvage, but, really, it seems the federal government has
ended it with the passage of this Act.
My question is how that relates to the international convention
that you've talked about and the goals that seem to be going on
through there if they are environmentally related. That goes on to my
next question, which is: In the SCOPIC provisions, is there any
allowance of environmental salvage for claims of saving the
shipowner from the claims of the fishery, the fishermen, and any type
of environmental salvage that's included within SCOPIC?
MR. BRICE:
Well, dealing with the second question first, as far as SCOPIC is
concerned, it in no way alters the obligations of a salvor which exist,
for example, in the Salvage Convention to take measures which will
protect the environment or put -another way not to harm the
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environment. So I do not think SCOPIC has any adverse effect on
that.
So far as the Florida legislation is concerned, that is something I
specifically raised in London because one can understand given the
nature of the wrecks which exist off Florida why special legislation
existed. The point that I sought to make was this, and I hope it is a
good one: That when you have a state, such as the State of Florida,
which is faced with a specific problem and which comes to its own
solution, there's no point in the name of so-called uniformity of
having an international convention which seeks to impose a new
regime.
So this I think, Morey, is an example of where uniformity can go
too far. So I think the UNESCO Convention would go too far.
There's much to be said to support the Florida solution.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
That's fine, sir. I was wondering if the panel had any comment
or observations about what we see sometimes in representing salvage
of recreational vessels and the continuing blurring between the
traditional definition of towage versus salvage. I was wondering if
the panel had any comments on that? Specifically, the question would
be that people are claiming that it is salvage versus a tow under a
variety of policies and what can the Convention do for that?
MR. BRICE:
Well, I suspect this is very much an American-oriented question.
There are certainly quite a number of cases where especially
expensive recreational vessels are salved. I've just had one recently
from the U.S. Virgin Islands. As far as we're concerned, the ordinary
law of salvage applies. Whether it is towage or salvage is a matter of
fact. You do have cases here in America I think under your Federal
Arbitration Act where all the parties are American and there are
recreational vessels. The courts have refused to send cases under
Lloyd's Form to London saying, really, the arbitration agreement is
not meant to affect that sort of case. It is not a very common problem,
but as an English lawyer, I do not see any particular problem with
recreational vessels.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
My question is for Mr. Brice as well. I've read your paper and I
heard what you were talking about before on SCOPIC. My question
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is coming from the comment in your paper where it said that the
salvor can elect SCOPIC during the salvage and then either the carrier
or insurance provider or whatever then follows. My question is this:
Can the carrier's insurer invoke SCOPIC as a defensive measure? I
say "defensive" in the sense that a lot of times as the insurer of a
vessel you have no idea what the ultimate salvage award is going to
be. When I listen to you talk about SCOPIC, I'm thinking, well, if
there's an appendix that's going to put some certainty on what the end
award can possibly be, depending on the equipment used, maybe it
would be a good idea for the vessel's attorney to invoke SCOPIC as
soon as he is advised that the captain has been given the Lloyd's Open
Form. Can you do that as the captain of a vessel or the insurer for the
vessel, or is it solely a situation where the salvor can choose to elect
SCOPIC and the appendix that comes with it with the schedule of
charges?
MR. BRICE:
Well, you've pinpointed a most important and fundamental point,
and that is that only the salvor who has signed a Lloyd's Form can
invoke SCOPIC. There's no right on the part of the shipowner or any
other property owner to invoke SCOPIC. It is an option for the
salvor. It means that if he goes on with the services and he's
obviously not making enough money under the ordinary Blackwall
award, then he knows he gets his guaranteed remuneration. So it is
entirely for the salvor to do. I'm afraid if you had your shipowner
client, no, you couldn't invoke SCOPIC on his part.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
I just wanted to note that I think SCOPIC first came into public
debate in the 1995 Institute meeting in this hall here. So good things
come out of lively discussions such as we've had today.
MR. PALMER:
Do you believe it is possible that the primary and the excess
underwriters should have the same benefit of limitation as the owner
and/or bareboat charterer?
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MR. BROWN:
Well, I guess the answer is you were talking about shipowner's
limitation of liability, and any claims against the underwriters would
not be direct claims against the underwriters except maybe in
Louisiana but they would be claims against the shipowner, and the
underwriters who stand behind the shipowner would ultimately be
entitled to any of the benefits the shipowner is able to obtain by
reason of the Limitation of Liability Act.
MR. PALMER:
Some P & I rules also provide that it is a provision, a covenant,
that the right to limit be asserted when it is proper to do so. Another
question that relates to limitation is kind of a perennial question, and
that is: What is the level of a corporate officer whose actual and/or
constructive knowledge is sufficient to support a finding that the
corporation has privity and/or actual or constructive knowledge of the
operational deficiencies or the administrative inadequacies which
caused or contributed to the vessel's disaster? And it is a factual
question, but it would be interesting to get your slant on what the state
of the cases is now about that level, and then we think in terms of
what is the level in Great Britain, and we can ask Geoffrey about that.
But I was thinking, Dick, you might give us the latest on that.
MR. BROWN:
Well, I'm not sure it is the latest. The basic definition, which
doesn't help much, is that it has to be someone high enough in the
corporate hierarchy so that his actions or inactions can be considered
that of the corporation. I think there have been cases where port
captains and people on that level have sufficed. I do not know of
anybody below that level who has been held to be, in effect, the alter
ego of the corporation.
MR. PALMER:
Would you say that perhaps you measure that by the extent of his
discretion and power to bind the corporation?
MR. BROWN:
I think his discretion and his authority are all questions that
would come into play in determining whether he is that sort of person.
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MR. HAYDEN:
I think that under the new ISM rules you're going to have some
very clear definitions of who's got what knowledge and authority
because it goes all the way to the top through the ISM rules.
MR. PALMER:
The designated person will have to have some very specific
knowledge under the new ISM Code.
MR. HAYDEN:
And if he doesn't have it, they are also inadequately staffed.
MR. PALMER:
You may be stuck if you do, and you'll certainly be stuck if you
do not know if you're a designated person. By provisions of the ISM
Code, the management is committed, is it not, to that knowledge, or is
it presumed that the designated person's knowledge is the
corporation's knowledge?
MR. HEALY:
I can't imagine any court in the United States holding that the
person named by the corporation as the designated person for ISM
purposes is not the alter ego of the corporation for purposes of
limitation of liability. I think it is almost a foregone conclusion.
Whoever is named as the designated person, his privity will definitely
be considered that of the owner.
MR. PALMER:
Yes. Would you say, then, that perhaps some of the major issues
thereafter will be whether or not the deficiency has a causal
connection to the disaster? And perhaps if the managers have set up
the proper system and have tried to have it enforced but the people on
the scene do not actually conduct themselves in accordance with the
regulation, would that not give the owners the defense that they tried
to prevent this kind of thing and had it all laid out and there was
negligence of somebody on the scene that did not execute?
MR. HEALY:
I think that's a separate issue. I'm talking about privity, actual
privity of the designated person. His privity, I'm convinced, will be
attributed to the corporation. But in the case of a seaman, or even a
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ship's officer on the scene, his privity would not be considered the
privity of the corporation. In this country it seems to be coming down
to a question of whether the fault is that of shipboard personnel or
shoreside personnel. If the fault was that of shoreside personnel, it is
almost a foregone conclusion that limitation will be denied. The rule,
as I understand it, is quite different in England.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Well, good morning. The good news is that collision lawyers
will not become obsolete despite scientific advance and technological
developments. Excessive speed, fog, carelessness, ignorance,
stupidity ... they all will preserve the profession we love. My paper
is a fantasy dealing with a future collision in the year 2025 in the
English Channel. A new mega-ship a little bit smaller than an aircraft
carrier carrying jumbo containers crosses the Atlantic in three days
propelled on the open ocean by a new engine that still burns fossil
fuel but is forced to operate on battery power near port cities because
of new regulations to prevent air pollution. My vision is clouded as to
the source of these antipollution measures-possibly a new part of the
MARPOL Convention or possibly a new global warming treaty that
sweeps maritime source pollution into all other major sources of
pollution.
I believe, before we get into the open ocean, that towage and
pilotage will probably change radically. Omnidirectional power
sources may make harbor tugs and docking pilots obsolete except for
the salvage after collisions and groundings. Compulsory pilots may
also disappear as the Coast Guard assumes the direction of all vessel
maneuvers into and -out of harbors. Of course, initially the
government lawyers will argue that vessel traffic control centers
merely advise masters, who remain in command of their vessels. But
eventually, one or two spectacular disasters accompanied by large
numbers of private bills in Congress will persuade a hesitant Congress
to assume liability for vessel traffic center negligence even as it
penalizes master and vessel failures to comply with the direct orders
of the vessel traffic control center. It does seem to me that privacy
seems doomed in the presence of video cameras on the bridge, video
cameras throughout the ship, as well as the omnipresence of black
boxes, which we call voyage data recorders. Those black boxes will
remove mystery and inscrutability from collisions. Instantaneous
satellite communications will give the home office of the shipowner
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the exact same information that is available to the master and watch
officers on the bridge. This knowledge of the shipboard conditions in
the home office, together with what we've already heard about the
1998 ISM Code, will make it difficult, if not impossible, to prove the
absence of privity and knowledge, thereby eliminating shipowner
limitation of liability.
By 2025, COLREGS will have been in force for almost fifty
years, roughly the same length of time from the 1897 Rules of the
road to the 1948 Safety of Life at Sea where we began the process of
changing the rules of the road from the age of sail to the age of
diesels. I do not envision major changes in COLREGS before 2025.
Our collision problem is loaded with navigational errors, most of
which will be familiar to you. One change may come with respect to
the human naked eye lookout. It seems that the helmsman or watch
officer may fulfill the lookout function in an age of electronic charts
and ARPA. Also, vessel traffic separation schemes will probably be
mandated so that a vessel's presence in the wrong traffic lane will be
an automatic fault. We do not envision any changes with respect to
the crossing rules and collision avoidance.
So what we have set up for our audience is the problem of this
collision, and we ask you to assess the percentages of fault. What
kind of argument would you make for a fifty-fifty, what kind of
argument for a two-thirds/one third or three-fourths/one-fourth?
That's the question that I ask you, and my colleague Mr. Hayden will
now ask me some questions.
MR. HAYDEN:
Well, Joe, let's assume that the situation you've depicted was a
crossing situation. As such was the OLERON STAR, our vessel of
the future, entitled or obligated to maintain its course and speed?
Let's start with that simple question right there.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Absolutely. Maintain course and speed. And I can't see any
reason to change that rule.
MR. HAYDEN:
Was the OLERON STAR's alteration of course, the ten degrees
to starboard that you have depicted at approximately 0430 appropriate
under the circumstances?
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PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
No, not enough. They should have made a course change of
perhaps thirty to forty-five degrees so that it would become obvious to
the approaching vessels.
MR. HAYDEN:
Well, if that course change of a minor ten degrees was not
appropriate, what rules was it in violation of?
What COLREGS were violated by its alteration to starboard of
ten degrees?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Failing to maintain course and speed because the vessels were in
sight at that time.
MR. HAYDEN:
Can that ten degrees starboard alteration be justified under
COLREGS?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
No.
MR. HAYDEN:
What about its failure at the time since they were in sight of each
other and approximately or somewhat less than three miles apart to
use sound signals?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Well, here we had a turn to starboard and no whistle signal. Of
course, that's another statutory fault.
MR. HAYDEN:
Your beautiful scenario indicates if there was a lookout it was
inadequate, and the use of ARPA and radar were both improper.
Would that alone be a contributory fault on the part of the OLERON
STAR?
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PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Yes. Now it seems the lookout requirement must be fulfilled and
that would be a statutory violation. Of course, inattention on the
bridge is always a violation of good seamanship.
MR. HAYDEN:
You have depicted a situation whereby the owners knew
everything, knew everything because of the instantaneous reporting to
home office. That means they would know course and speed. They
would know weather conditions, speed and fog, and they would also
have the ability to observe from the black box the voyage data
recorder sometime later what the practices were on that bridge. In
light of that, do you think that an owner will ever be able to show that
the owner has exercised due diligence in manning or crewing or
operating the vessel if the home office has instantaneous monitoring
of what's going on and they do not counteract or correct what's being
done on the bridge?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
I think the instantaneous monitoring is going to change the
world. What I see in my problem, I had the instantaneous knowledge
being communicated to the home office but nobody was home at the
home office at the time of the collision.
JUDGE SEAR:
But if somebody is home, Joe, you're saying that limitation
would never lie?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
I think limitation would not lie, sir, because the Supreme Court
back in The Linseed King said that the ability to do something, to
change the dangerous situation was enough. The Linseed King
involved the corporate owner sending a letter to his masters saying do
not operate in icy conditions in the river. There were icy conditions in
the river. The ferry sank, and eighty people were killed. The
Supreme Court found no possibility of limitation of liability because
there was privity and knowledge in the operation.
So it seems to me that the possibility of control is going to make
it less likely under the existing limitation law to achieve proof of the
absence of privity or knowledge. That is, of course, the requirement
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of the law: that the parties seeking limitation of liability prove the
absence of privity and knowledge.
MR. HAYDEN:
Well, I think that the law as it currently stands in the States is if
the owner interferes or tells the master what to do, the owner is going
to be held at fault and there will be no limitation; a la the carrier in
the Great Lakes where the port captain told them to run for shore, the
ship ran for shore and capsized and killed everybody, and there was
no limitation. The same thing will happen if they have instantaneous
knowledge available to them and they do not act. If there's no one
there to act and give instructions, they are going to be found
responsible anyhow and without limitation.
JUDGE SEAR:
Isn't the situation on the scene somewhat different? The
navigational decisions that have to be made are not made in a
vacuum. They are made at the time that they exist, at the time that
they transpire, and that can't be conveyed back to some other source.
MR. HAYDEN:
Well, an instantaneous alteration, of course, or a requirement of
that nature, such as the blowing of a whistle, cannot be sent back
home to get authorization, and then be given. But under the scenario
presented by Joe, I think that you've got an owner who can monitor
the fact that they are navigating in dense fog in the English Channel at
the moment and they are still going full speed and they are not paying
attention to what they're doing. We haven't got a lookout posted. We
only have a single man on watch at the time.
Where do we go from there? The owner has to know the
conditions if he's receiving instantaneous communications; not so
much the instantaneous change of course in an extreme situation, but
constant proceeding in fog or in a perilous situations the owner has to
know it. He has the weather report right in front of him. He should
know what's going on under this scenario.
But I think that we're going to run into another very, very serious
situation when we get into the port safety authorities; where they start
directing the movement of the vessels. What are we going to do with
them? Who's going to assume responsibility? Joe, what happens if
the vessel follows the "you are ordered to" requirement under port
safety and the master does what he's told to by the port safety
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authority? Who's got the liability when the collision occurs? Who's
going to take it down to the bottom? Is the owner going to pay?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Well, unless we change our laws radically, the in rem liability of
the vessel will continue. The master may be criminally liable for
failure to comply with the orders of the port safety authority. As I
envision it, the government will initially reject the idea of imposing
liability on itself, but it will eventually decide to assume that liability.
MR. HAYDEN:
But if you take a master proceeding anywhere where there's a
port safety directive and he's ordered to do something and he does it,
the government should have responsibility just like they do for the
acts of an air traffic controller. When he makes a mistake, the
government is responsible. The government steps in, and the
government does pay. Why shouldn't they be responsible here?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Well, the government had to be dragged into the question of
responsibility from that first crash some forty years ago when the air
traffic controller ordered two planes to land on the same runway at the
same time. Air traffic controllers have been occasionally held liable
under the existing law. I foresee that the same kind of principle
would apply as the port safety directives begin to force masters to
comply with the orders of the Coast Guard.
MR. HAYDEN:
Would the owner be responsible in personam as opposed to the
vessel being responsible in rem? That might be a difference right
there.
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
That's a difference. I do not foresee in personam liability unless
we change the statute, but the in rem liability would continue.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
Joe, isn't it likely that in the handout, the diagram showing the
collision would probably be an exhibit from the OLERON STAR, but
that the exact same tracks might be used as an exhibit by the BISBY
EXPRESS except that the boundary would be below the collision site.
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Thus, there would be a great deal of discrepancy between both sides
as to where the actual collision occurred, and that would complicate
the question as to whether the vessels were in violation of the
boundary?
PROFESSOR SWEENEY:
Yes, there would be considerable debate as to the actual site of
the collision. I foresee in the future with the black box and with the
constant patrol of the radar picture from the Dover headquarters that
you would have information available for any court which would
show the actual site of the collision in the eastbound lane; that the
westbound ship was in the eastbound lane. I foresee that in the future
that would be considered a statutory fault.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:
Why do you pick on the ten degree course change by the
OLERON STAR as a fault? You stipulated that it was already driving
with its left wheel on the line. Isn't it just doing something to place
itself more properly in its traffic lane?
MR. BROWN:
I think the real problem with being at fault has to do with Rule
17(a)(2). By the time that course change is made, the vessels are in
sight of each other; so therefore the regular crossing rules ought to
apply. Under 17(a)(2) of the COLREGS, the so-called privileged or
stand-on vessel-and I'll quote this-"may take action to avoid
collision by her maneuver alone." That means that the stand-on
vessel's action should be such as to result in avoidance of collision by
her maneuver alone.
In that situation, a ten degree course change is not enough to
avoid collision by her maneuver alone. It would have to be a hard
course change, hard right. I think Joe said thirty to forty-five degrees.
You might want to come right around another fifty or sixty degrees to
make sure that the give-way vessel is not able to hit you, because if
you're avoiding collision by your maneuver alone, you must take
action that's drastic enough to accomplish that result, no matter what
the give-way ship might do.
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